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Criminal Sentencing in Antebellum America: 
A North-South Comparison 
David J. Bodenhamer* 
Abstract: Scholars often view the 19th-century empha-
sis on efficient and predictable justice as synonymous 
with the rise of the commercial-industrial state, and 
especially with urbanizing areas. An examination of the 
sentences assigned to white defendants convicted of cri-
mes in two states of the antebellum United States casts 
doubt on this interpretation. Indiana was a northern, 
urbanizing, commercial-industrial state; Georgia was 
southern, rural, and agricultural. Both states operated 
with similar legal systems and criminal codes, although 
Georgia assigned sentencing authority to the judge and 
Indiana to the jury. A comparative analysis of sentences 
in the two states reveals: (1) Georgia sentences fell into 
a more narrow and predictable (hence »bureaucratic«) 
range than did Indiana sentences; (2) Indiana juries dis-
played no predictability in sentencing; and (3) both sta-
tes developed »plea bargainings despite the wide dis-
crepancy in sentencing patterns. This latter finding con-
tradicts the traditional view that plea bargains were a 
late-19th century innovation. 
Over the past decade historians have exhibited considerable interest in 
early nineteenth-century attempts to reform criminal justice. Most of this 
research has detailed the shift from retributive to reformative justice and 
has focused on the development of the penitentiary, the revision of cri-
minal codes, and the various efforts to abolish the death penalty. Traditio-
nally, scholars have explained these changes as the consequence of the 
liberal-democratic ideas unleashed by the American Revolution.(l) 
Other historians challenge this view and interpret the changes in cri-
minal justice in terms of modernization theory. In the United States mo-
dernization is usually synonymous with the commercial-industrial city, a 
development associated with the northern states. Dominant social values 
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in modernizing areas are order, predictability, and security of property. 
These concerns undoubtedly reflect the nature of the urban environment, 
with its social stratification, cosmopolitanism, and anomie. Because tradi-
tional structures of authority are weak or non-existent in the city, law 
must control threatening behavior. So in modern societies, the criminal 
justice system concerns itself with prosecuting crimes that threaten order 
and property and attempts to ensure predictability and efficiency in pu-
nishment. It also relies heavily on negotiated pleas and sentences, or 
so-called »plea bargaining«.(2) 
Most often the modernization argument draws support from the decline 
of moral-order offenses and the concurrent rise of property crimes in 
urbanizing areas during the first half of the nineteenth century. Few scho-
lars would dispute this general trend, yet by itself this evidence is insuffi-
cient. There have been few comparative studies on the differences between 
urban and rural areas and virtually no careful examination of criminal 
sentencing, one of the key factors in any attempt to ensure efficient, pre-
dictable punishment. 
This paper examines the sentences assigned to white defendants convic-
ted of crimes in two antebellum states, one midwestern (Indiana) and one 
southern (Georgia). There are several reasons for the choice of these lo-
cales. Both states experienced similar demographic and political develop-
ment; both adopted in large measure the reform agenda of the early ni-
neteenth century; and excellent data exist on the criminal justice systems -
state and local - of each area.(3) For this study, there were two important 
dissimilarities between the two states. In terms of economic development, 
Indiana embraced free-market capitalism, while Georgia maintained a 
precapitalist slave system with some market-oriented features. The most 
striking difference involving criminal process concerns the responsibility 
for sentencing. In Georgia, the trial judge had sole authority to assign the 
penalties allowed by law; the jury exercised such power in Indiana. 
For purposes of comparison, this study explores sentencing patterns only 
for white felons. In Georgia, a separate court tried slave defendants under 
a special code; and free black defendants in both states were too few to 
establish any meaningful conclusion. Among the questions asked are: 1. 
What was the purpose of punishment? 2. Who had the power to sentence, 
and what does this imply about the system of criminal justice? 3. What 
were the statutory limits on the sentencing power? 4. How did actual 
sentences compare with these statutory boundaries, and to what extent did 
they achieve the state's aim in punishment? 5. Did the defendant play any 
role in the sentencing process (i.e., did plea bargaining occur)? 
Several types of sources provide answers to these questions. Legislative 
debates, official state reports, and private correspondence suggest the in-
tended purpose of punishment; session laws outline the sentencing process 
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and its statutory limits; and prison records and trial court minutes yield 
valuable information on the sentences actually imposed. A caveat is ne-
cessary, however. Antebellum trial records usually do not reveal particular 
information about the crime before the court, nor do they provide infor-
mation about the socio-economic status of the defendant. Without such 
evidence, the historian must refrain from making judgments about the 
justice of individual sentences. 
Purpose of Punishment 
By the mid-eighteenth century reformation had replaced retribution as the 
goal of an enlightened criminal law. This change in the theory of punish-
ment owed much to the Italian scholar, Cesare Beccaria, whose treatise, 
On Crime and Punishment, became the standard for many post-Revolu-
tionary reforms of punition. Among his many prescriptions for achieving a 
rational and humane criminal process, Beccaria urged that punishment be 
strictly limited, proportionate to the crime, and inflicted with speed and 
certainty.(4) The Revolutionary generation took this lesson to heart and 
replaced inhumane features of their legal system with rational laws and 
salutary punishments. A belief that such reforms would control crime 
more effectively led to vigorous efforts in the early republic to limit or 
abolish the death penalty and to develop institutions which would reform 
offenders.(5) 
Throughout the antebellum years Hoosiers (citizens of Indiana) publicly 
and privately declared that reformative principles must guide the criminal 
process. The state's first constitution enjoined »cruel and unusual punish-
ments« and required that all penalties »be proportioned to the nature of 
the offense.« (6) Over thirty years later delegates to a second constitutional 
convention overwhelmingly endorsed, and voters ratified, a section that 
the penal code be »founded on principles of reformation, and not vindic-
tive justice.« (7) Juvenile offenders in particular, the legislature decided 
the next year, must »be treated with humanity and in a manner calculated 
to promote their reformation.« (8) 
Private citizens also expressed support for a legal system which acted to 
redeem malefactors. It was in society's best interest, wrote a prominent 
resident of Marion County, to show a »spirit of forgiveness.« When laws 
were based on arbitrary and sanguinary principles, »then the same feeling 
of murder and revenge would rule in the breast of its lowest members.« (9) 
This sentiment found voice in numerous essays and petitions, especially in 
the 1830s and 1840s, during legislative debates on proposals to abolish the 
death penalty. Declaring that »we live in an age . . . of Reform,« a group of 
Union County citizens petitioned for criminal laws that »shunned the Spi-
79 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 15 — 1990 — No. 4, 77-94
rit of revenge and retaliation« and sought instead to restore offenders to 
society.(10) 
The law of criminal punishment in Indiana reflected this reformist im-
pulse, although incompletely. Soon after entering the Union, legislators 
abandoned the territorial practice of whipping in favor of confinement in 
a penitentiary modeled on the Auburn plan of New York. On the other 
hand, the death penalty survived repeated attempts to abolish it; and de-
spite a constitutional mandate, efforts to establish houses of refuge for 
juveniles and females failed to gain legislative support until the 1860s.(l 1) 
The law of criminal punishment in antebellum Georgia also responded 
to reform efforts, although with somewhat different results. For example, 
the state established a penitentiary at Milledgeville in 1816, only to aban-
don it for a brief time in the 1830s. Even when in use, the reform of felons 
appeared to be secondary to their removal from society. Nor was the cam-
paign to abolish the death penalty as strong in Georgia. But the Beccarian 
influence on the criminal code was more explicit and more pronounced 
than in Indiana. This influence was especially apparent in the lengthy 
critique of the state's first criminal code, which James McPherson Berrien 
made in 1817 in response to a legislative mandated 12) 
Berrien, then a superior court judge, took his task seriously; his report 
was lengthy and detailed, treating every section of the code in turn. He 
directed some of his most severe criticism at the legislature for its incom-
plete reform of the law of punishment. In framing the code, he wrote, the 
legislature had followed Beccaria's admonition to reduce the severity of 
punishment, but it had done little to make punition more certain. The 
central problem was that the judge determined the sentence for some cri-
mes, while for similar offenses the jury fixed the extent of punishment. 
This divided responsibility introduced inconsistency into the criminal pro-
cess, Berrien argued, and ultimately it destroyed the redemptive features of 
the penal code.(13) This critique evidently had a desired effect: in 1818 the 
legislature revised the code along the lines of Berrien's suggestions. 
The Sentencing Authority 
As noted above, Indiana and Georgia differed in their assignment of 
sentencing authority. Indiana law made jurors responsible for fixing the 
sentence in most non-capital trials; the judge determined punishment 
only when the defendant admitted guilt or when the defendant, with the 
consent of the prosecutor, submitted his case to the court for judg-
ment^ 14) The decision to vest such authority in the jury was consistent 
with other provisions of the state's statute and appellate law. In a practice 
which ran counter to other antebellum states, Hoosier juries had sole po-
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wer to decide law and fact in criminal trials. Lawmakers and jurists de-
clared repeatedly that such power properly belonged to the people, and in a 
remarkable decision in 1857, the state Supreme Court ruled that jurors 
even had the right to interpret constitutional law.(15) 
In Georgia, the judge alone exercised the power to sentence in cases 
»where the term of punishment . . . (was) discretionary,« even though the 
code admonished him to pay »due respect to any recommendation which 
the Jury may think proper to make....« The judge also had the right to 
commute a death sentence to life imprisonment whenever the conviction 
rested solely on circumstantial evidenced 16) 
Statutory Boundaries 
Sentences had to fall within limits set by statute law, but within those 
boundaries the judge or jury exercised considerable discretion. Horse 
theft, for example, exposed the Indiana criminal to a penalty which could 
range from 2 to 14 years in the state pen plus a fine up to $1,000; punish-
ment for the same offense in Georgia ran from 6 to 14 years. Although 
there was wide latitude in the length of a sentence, the legislature pres-
cribed the type of punishment for each crime. Thus, a conviction for ca-
pital murder necessarily brought a sentence of death by hanging, and con-
finement for some minimum term in the state penitentiary was required 
for other felonies. 
Both Indiana and Georgia law allowed punishment to vary within legis-
latively mandated limits, but striking differences existed in maximum 
sentences in each state. Georgia set an upper limit of 5 to 7 years for most 
felonies against persons or property; only rape, mayhem resulting in loss 
of a tongue, and horse-stealing carried the potential of a longer sentence. 
Indiana law, on the other hand, established 21 years as the maximum 
sentence for most crimes against persons and 14 years for crimes against 
property. Unlike Georgia, these prison terms could be accompanied by 
fines not to exceed $1,000. 
Nothing illustrates the greater latitude given to Indiana juries better 
than the statutory penalties for manslaughter and robbery. A conviction 
for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter in Indiana brought a sentence 
from 2 to 21 years; in Georgia, voluntary manslaughter drew terms from 2 
to 4 years and involuntary manslaughter from 1 to 3 years. Robbery in 
Indiana placed the defendant in jeopardy for a term of 2 to 14 years, while 
the same crime in Georgia carried a maximum penalty of 5 or 7 years, 
depending on the degree of force used by the robber. 
It is unclear why such wide variance existed in the statutory punish-
ments of the two states. But there is no evidence that lighter penalties in 
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Georgia stemmed from a lesser concern about crime or its consequences. 
An opposite conclusion may be more accurate. Georgia lawmakers evi-
dently took to heart the lessons taught by Beccaria and other liberal refor-
mers and set out to increase the certainty of punishment by reducing its 
severity.(17) 
More puzzling than Georgia's lesser penalties is the wide discretion gi-
ven to Indiana juries. There is no direct evidence on this question, but it 
may have represented an attempt to give legal substance to the ideology of 
reform by allowing jurors to match the punishment to the circumstances 
of the offense and the character of the offender. Even so, there was danger 
of an abuse of power in such a system, as John McPherson Berrien noted 
in his critique of a similar, though more attenuated, feature in Georgia's 
code of 1816. Such authority in the hands of twelve individuals, he warned, 
would end not in a rational correspondence of crime and punishment but 
rather in a compromise on some arbitrary term in order to discharge a 
burdensome duty. This result would make illusory any claim that the aim 
of punishment was to redeem the wayward individuals 18) 
Sentencing Patterns 
Regardless of the statutory bounds of punishment, and the reasons for 
their placement, it is important to know the actual sentences given to 
convicted defendants. In this study, two sources - prison records and mi-
nute books from trial court - yield such information.(19) Prison records 
disclose valuable data in convenient form: the central register of inmates 
lists the crime, sentence, time actually served, and certain socio-economic 
characteristics of the criminal - age, nativity, county of residence, occu-
pation, and at times, level of education. This information enables the hi-
storian to determine the mean, median, and range of sentences for those 
crimes which ended in prison terms, and some things about the way per-
sonal characteristics of defendants might have influenced the sentences 
they received. Prison data are limited in at least two ways, however. The 
registers disclose none of the circumstances of the crime itself, nor do 
these records reveal anything about the trial which produced the convic-
tion. 
Local court records provide the glimpse of the criminal process which 
prison books ignore. Although this information varies by state and even by 
county, the minute books reveal the legal action, or lack of action, taken 
on every felony. Sometimes, as was true in Indiana, the data are skimpy 
and provide only a formulaic record of the case. The minute books of 
Georgia, on the other hand, often contain an extensive transcript of the 
testimony and other evidence in addition to basic trial data. This was espe-
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cially true when the defendant appealed his conviction. But even the best 
minute books list only the defendant's name. To discover the class or status 
of the criminal, the historian must consult other records - census sche-
dules, tax rolls, city directories and the like. Still, when used together, trial 
documents and prison registers reveal much information about the senten-
cing practices of local courts. 
Sentencing Patterns in Antebellum Indiana and Georgia 
For the period 1830 to 1860 most convicted felons were sentenced to terms 
in the state prison; by definition, a lesser sentence meant that the crime 
was a misdemeanor. Of course, the vast majority (75 percent) of all felony 
indictments in both Indiana and Georgia never came to trial; and 25 per-
cent of the cases carried to judgment resulted in verdicts of not guilty or 
guilty of a misdemeanor. To be found guilty of a felony, however, meant a 
prison term and, in Indiana, a fine, unless the offense was capital and thus 
required the death penalty. 
Surprising similarities and differences existed in the sentencing patterns 
of the two states, depending on the type of crime involved. The weighted 
average sentence for property crimes(20) during the 30-year period was 3.4 
years in Indiana and slightly over 4 years in Georgia. But the relationship 
between these two means was not constant. In the 1830s, the average 
sentence for property crime in Georgia was 3.24 years; by the 1850s this 
figure had risen by eleven months to 4.13 years. Conversely, Indiana im-
posed somewhat stiffer sentences in the 1830s than in the 1850s, with the 
highest average sentence occurring in the 1840s (Table 1). 
A breakdown of sentences into discrete groups helps to explain the hig-
her average in Georgia. There, almost 7 of 10 sentences (65.7 percent) fell 
within a range from 3 to 5 years, while over one-half (52.9 percent) of all 
prison sentences for property crimes in Indiana were for 1 to 2 years (Table 
2). This pattern held constant for all three decades in Georgia and for two 
of three in Indiana. Only in the 1840s did the number of property offen-
ders in the lowest category (1-2 years) slip below 50 percent. 
The lighter sentences imposed by Indiana juries for property crimes is 
somewhat surprising. Given recent arguments by legal historians, especial-
ly William Nelson, that antebellum criminal law placed a greater emphasis 
on the protection of property, then we might expect longer, not shorter, 
prison terms for Hoosier felons.(21) Indeed, the use of a low dollar value 
($5.00) to demarcate grand and petit larceny and the high maximum 
sentences allowed under Indiana law would suggest that Nelson is correct. 
So it is surprising to discover that the typical prison term was briefer in 
Indiana, an emerging commercial state, than in Georgia. And had it not 
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been for the imposition of terms over 10 years in 4 percent of all sentences, 
the average confinement would have been even shorter. 
Local court records illustrate the differences in sentencing patterns even 
more dramatically than do the prison registers. In Marion County, India-
na, site of the state capital and an important midwestern commercial cen-
ter, the average prison term for larceny was 2.5 years, less than the state-
wide average by almost one full year. But the same crime drew an average 
penalty of 5.5 years in Muscogee County, Georgia (Columbus), and almost 
4.5 years in Bibb County (Macon). What caused the difference? Certainly 
not a higher level of economic activity or greater population density - two 
variables which might have resulted in stiffer sentences - because Marion 
County was larger and more economically dynamic than either of the 
southern counties. Nor does the age or occupation of criminals explain the 
difference. The age profile was very similar in all three counties.(22) Mo-
reover, 87 percent of the property felons from the Georgia counties clai-
med respectable occupations - 52 percent were craftsmen or professionals -
while 41 percent of Marion County's criminals were listed as laborers. Any 
attempt to attribute lower sentences to the presence of felons from a higher 
social class does not find support in the data.(23) 
When sentences for violent crime are compared(24), the different pat-
terns of the two states become more pronounced and more difficult to 
explain. By all accounts, the South was the most violent region of the 
nation; indeed, Georgia courts handled almost twice as many prosecutions 
for violent crimes than did their counterparts in Indiana.(25) But Hoosier 
juries sentenced these criminals to far longer sentences on the average-and 
imposed a stiffer median sentence - than did Georgia judges. For the 
antebellum decades, the mean sentence for violent offenders in Indiana 
was 8.2 years compared to 3.6 years in Georgia. Moreover, the Georgia 
mean for each decade from 1830 to 1860 was within a narrow three-month 
range of the 30-year average, whereas the Indiana figure stood at 7.82 
years for the 1830s, dropped slightly to 7.4 years in the 1840s, and climbed 
to 8.5 years in the 1850s (Table 3). 
These averages must be interpreted with caution. After all, 4 or 5 years 
was the maximum punishment for most violent crimes under Georgia law; 
in Indiana, the maximum was 14 or 21 years, depending on the offense. 
Thus, a longer average term would be expected in the Hoosier state. But 
what is interesting is that one-half of all sentences for violent crimes in 
Georgia fall into the 3 to 5 year bracket, and only 1 of 10 offenders recei-
ved terms over 6 years. By contrast, 53.5 percent of all violent felons in 
Indiana served terms of six years or more. Moreover, one in every six such 
Hoosier inmates received life imprisonment; in Georgia, only 3 in 100 did 
(Table 4). 
It is tempting to attribute the difference in penalties to the southerner's 
alleged tolerance of violence. To be sure, the rather limited punishments 
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prescribed by the Georgia legislature lends support to such an interpreta-
tion. But other evidence (grand jury reports, legislative debates and private 
correspondence) reveals that Georgians expressed great concern about the 
impact of violence on their society, and they demanded that violent cri-
minals receive a just measure of punishment.(26) It is also difficult to 
reconcile the image of the tolerant southerner with the frequent resort to 
the gallows. Although no register exists for whites who suffered death for 
their crimes, it is noteworthy that Bibb and Muscogee counties sentenced 
19 men to hang during a 30-year period.(27) Finally, the spread between 
the sentencing means in Indiana and Georgia disappears when only ur-
banizing counties are compared. Marion County juries imposed an aver-
age punishment of 4 years (median: 3 years) in the state pen, while Bibb 
and Muscogee judges levied terms which averaged 4.45 years (median: 4 
years). 
As was the case with criminals convicted of property offenses, 
socio-economic data do not explain adequately the sentencing patterns for 
violent crimes. Both the average age at time of confinement (32.7 years in 
Indiana, 31.5 years in Georgia) and the distribution of inmate ages were 
similar. It is more plausible to argue that considerations of social class 
influenced sentencing decisions, although aggregate data support this only 
in part. Almost three-fourths (73.8 percent) of the violent felons in the 
Indiana prison were laborers, a figure which suggests that Hoosier juries 
might have imposed longer sentences in an effort to control this d a n g e -
rous class.« (28) Yet in Georgia, where average sentences were significant-
ly lower, almost 14 percent of violent criminals listed no occupation. Alt-
hough this does not disprove any class-based interpretation of the practice 
in Indiana, it casts doubt on the efficacy of this as the only explanation of 
sentencing decisions. 
The different location of the sentencing authority might explain the 
similarity of punishment for property felons, as well as the dissimilarity 
for violent criminals. Judges determined the sentence in Georgia, and ex-
cept for crimes which attracted community attention, they undoubtedly 
came to view their function as routine or administrative. In most cases, 
there was little to distinguish one felony from countless other serious cri-
mes which came to trial during the judicial tenure. Thus, it might be 
expected that the judge would impose similar penalties for similar crimes. 
The same conclusion cannot be drawn for states like Indiana where 
juries determined the extent of punishment. Jurors had scant experience 
with criminal trials. While there was no limit on the number of times a 
citizen might appear on the venire, most jurors served only for one court 
session. Also, the liberal number of challenges permitted defense or pro-
secution attorneys decreased the number of times an individual juror sat 
on a criminal trial. Add to this the reliance in the 1840s and 1850s on 
85 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 15 — 1990 — No. 4, 77-94
bystanders at court to serve as jurors, and it seems likely that for most 
jurors each case was unique, each crime was arypical.(29) It is also pro-
bable that jurors were tempted to assess a harsh penalty as a way of ex-
pressing community outrage at offense or offender, or conversely, to soften 
a punishment when the defendant clearly violated a law, but did so for a 
reason justifiable by community standards. 
If this interpretation is correct, then we should expect to find more 
variance in sentencing by the jury than by the judge. A survey of sentences 
for specific crimes suggests that this was indeed the case. With few excep-
tions, Georgia judges appear to have imposed similar sentences for similar 
crimes. They had begun to administer criminal justice in a bureaucratic 
fashion. Such was not the case in Indiana, where there were few routine 
sentences. For example, the prison register for 1845 listed four inmates 
convicted of rape or attempt to rape. (The statute law defined these as 
separate crimes but provided identical penalties of 2 to 21 years for each.) 
A mulatto received the maximum sentence of 21 years for an attempted 
rape, while a black man from the same county was sentenced to 5 years for 
the same offense. Vastly different terms assigned to two whites serving 
time on manslaughter convictions make the point even more dramatically. 
In one instance the sentence was 10 years; for another, 2 years. Listed in a 
column headed »cause as assigned by themselves for commission of offen-
se,« the inmate with the longer sentence had written »unintentional«; the 
other inmate claimed to have acted »in defense of his family.« 
These examples, and others like them(30), must be interpreted cautious-
ly because circumstances of the crime are unknown, as are the age, sex, 
and social status of the victims. But the existence of such widely varying 
sentences lends credence to complaints by editors and others that jurors 
assigned punishments capriciously and did not attempt to match the 
sentence to the severity of the crime.(31) 
Plea Bargaining 
Almost without exception, legal historians have concluded that the plea 
bargain developed in response to the demands placed on the criminal ju-
stice system by late nineteenth and early twentieth century population 
growth, especially in urban areas.(32) So an unexpected finding of this 
study is that plea bargaining occurred in the courts of antebellum Georgia, 
and while the evidence is not as strong, it almost certainly existed in In-
diana as well. 
It is not easy to show plea bargaining at work; such agreements between 
prosecutor and defendant rarely appear in the formal court record. But 
most legal scholars recognize that a change of plea from not guilty to 
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guilty, especially guilty of a lesser crime, signals that the parties to the case 
reached some agreement on its disposition. In the four Georgia counties 
surveyed, this change of plea occurred in 12 percent of all felony trials; 
and in the great majority of these cases the defendant pleaded guilty to a 
lesser crime. 
A few examples are instructive here. In July, 1848, Augustus N. Har-
grove was indicted in Murray County for stabbing a man in a barroom 
brawl. A plea of not guilty at the arraignment gave way to a confession of 
guilt to the lesser charge of assault and battery. Conviction of this misde-
meanor brought a fine of $100 and costs, but Hargrove had avoided a term 
in the state prison.(33) The next term witnessed the indictment of William 
Pearcy for assault with intent to murder and a plea of guilty to simple 
assault. The fine was 6 1/4 cents.(34) Other Georgia counties accepted the 
same practice. In November, 1852, Thomas Stubblefield was indicted in 
Muscogee Superior Court for assault with intent to murder, but he pleaded 
guilty to assault and battery and escaped with a slight fine.(35) 
There is little doubt that the judge knew of such agreements between 
prosecutor and defendant. Indeed, in some cases the judge may have set 
the stage for a negotiated plea by signaling his willingness to impose a light 
sentence or to dismiss other charges against the defendant. The extent of 
judicial involvement is revealed in an entry in the Bibb County minute 
book for 1846. There the judge promised to treat the defendants leniently 
if they would admit guilt and promise to refrain from further Sunday 
openings of their tippling houses.(36) On other occasions, judges arranged 
for arbitration after an indictment had been issued in an effort to keep the 
case from reaching trial.(37) 
The evidence from Indiana is not as full or as explicit as that from 
Georgia - there were fewer cases where defendants switched pleas to guil-
ty, for example - but court records suggest that prior agreement occurred 
in some cases, especially for misdemeanors. A typical case involved a plea 
of guilty to some indictments in exchange for an acknowledgement by the 
prosecutor that he would not pursue other indictments against the defen-
dant. In a letter requesting a pardon for a Switzerland County liquor dea-
ler, the petitioning citizen noted that »there was 74 indictments against 
him, I was present in Court, and he came and voluntarily pleaded guilty to 
20 of these indictments upon the prosecutor not pressing the balance.« (38) 
Prior agreement also occurred in felony cases. The Lafayette (Ind.) Jour-
nal reported in June 1855 that four men had been convicted of the murder 
of one Cephus Farenbough. Two of the defendants pleaded not guilty, went 
before the jury, and received the death penalty; the remaining two defen-
dants confessed their guilt and the judge sentenced them to life terms in 
the state penitentiary. »The public are awaiting with considerable interests 
the paper remarked,« to know the reason which induced the prosecuting 
attorney to allow the milder punishments ....« (39) 
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Guilty pleas were sometimes the result of obvious bargaining. But in 
Indiana many defendants pleaded guilty with no overt prior arrangement. 
The extent of this practice is surprising. Only 35 percent of all misdemea-
nants who came to trial in Marion County Circuit Court chose to contest 
the charge. For moral-order misdemeanors (liquor-related offenses, ga-
ming, etc.) over 90 percent of defendants admitted their guilt. Of course, 
the figure was much less in trials for felony crimes. Only 8 percent of these 
defendants pleaded guilty from 1823 to 1860, with most of those pleas 
coming in the 1850s. 
It is not easy to know what induced people to confess their guilt, but 
most defendants surely expected lighter, or at least more consistent, treat-
ment from the judge in return for their plea. Milton Neumann has called 
this expectation »implicit bargainings (40) In other words, defendants 
believed that they would be better off if they plead guilty than if they 
contested the indictment and lost. This was not an unrealistic assumption 
in Indiana, given the inconsistent sentencing patterns of Hoosier juries. 
The range of sentences assigned by juries in similar cases was much grea-
ter than the range of penalties assigned by the judges. 
Conclusion 
Indiana and Georgia represent two models of economic development and 
two stages of modernization during the antebellum decades, yet each state 
adopted the criminal justice reforms characteristic of the United States 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. Reformation, not retribu-
tion, was the goal of punishment. Sentencing patterns, both in statutes and 
in practice, were consistent with the desire to redeem the miscreant and 
return him to society. Even when the law permitted lengthy sentences, 
most felons served only a few years in prison. 
The key difference in criminal process between the two states was in the 
sentencing authority. Indiana gave wide latitude to the jury to establish an 
appropriate sentence within statutory bounds; Georgia reserved this power 
for the judge. The result was shorter prison terms for property crimes in 
Indiana, a finding not expected for a state with a vigorous market econo-
my, and briefer confinement for violent crimes in Georgia, an expected 
outcome that is offset in large measure by the southern state's more fre-
quent resort to the gallows. 
More striking is the wide variance found in the sentencing patterns in 
Indiana and the much smaller range discovered in Georgia. Juries may 
have embodied popular justice, but they were also unpredictable and more 
likely to be swayed by the unique facts and local circumstances surroun-
ding each case. Judges, even when elected, were much more even-handed 
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in the sentences they awarded for similar crimes. Yet regardless of which 
agent was responsible for sentencing, plea bargaining, at least implicit 
agreements, developed in both states well in advance of the time most 
scholars assign for its emergence. 
Criminal justice in the antebellum United States operated within 
boundaries that varied from state to state and, as a result, reflected local 
circumstances and concerns. Yet despite the marked dissimilarities in the 
economic organization of the separate regions and even in the location of 
the power of punishment within the criminal process, the character of 
justice in the early republic was more alike than different. The American 
Revolution unleashed a reform ideology that shaped the administration of 
criminal justice in profound ways, often in a manner not consistent with 
theoretical understandings about the relationship of the law to a society's 
fundamental social and economic structure. 
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Table 1: 
Average Sentence Length for Property Crimes 
by Decade, Indiana and Georgia, 1830-1859 
Table 2: 
Percentage of Sentences by Length of Term for 
Property Crimes, Indiana and Georgia, 1830-1859 
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Years Indiana Georgia 
1830-39 3.5 yrs. 3.24 yrs. 
1840-49 3.9 3.95 
1850-59 3.3 4.13 
1830-1859 3.4 4.03 
Length of Indiana Georgia 
Sentence n = 4 9 1 n = 137 
1 yr. 7.9% 3.6% 
2 yrs. 45.0 13.1 
3 yrs. 15.3 24.8 
4 yrs. 7.3 30.7 
5 yrs. 11.2 10.2 
6-10 yrs. 9.2 10.2 
11-15 yrs. 4.2 2.2 
16-20 yrs. 0 > 1 
Unknown 0 4.3 
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Table 3: 
Average Sentence Length for Violent Crimes 
by Decade, Indiana and Georgia, 1830-1859* 
•Excludes life and capital sentences 
Table 4: 
Percentage of Sentences by Length of Term for 
Violent Crimes, Indiana and Georgia, 1830-1859* 
Length of Indiana Georgia 
Sentence n = 77 n = 81 
i yr. 0% 9.9% 
2 yrs. 16.9 13.6 
3 yrs. 7.8 18.5 
4 yrs. 2.6 28.4 
5 yrs. 11.7 16.0 
6-10 yrs. 22.1 6.2 
11-20 yrs. 7.8 0 
21+yrs. 13.0 0 
Life 18.2 2.5 
Unknown 0 4.9 
•Excludes capital sentences 
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Years Indiana Georgia 
1830-39 7.82 yrs. 3.3 yrs. 
1840-49 7.4 3.8 
1850-59 8.5 3.5 
1830-59 8.2 3.6 
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